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Taking Capital Jurors Seriously
CRAIG HANEY*
INTRODUCTION
I want to begin this Commentary by acknowledging my admiration for the
scholars whose research is reflected in the articles appearing in this Sympo-
sium. The data now being collected by the Capital Jury Project reflect an
enormous amount of very difficult work, the mastery of many complicated
methodological problems, and a subtle and sophisticated grasp of the
numerous, thorny legal issues that surround capital litigation. It can be said,
without a hint of exaggeration, that what Kalven and Zeisel did for the
American jury in their classic study,' William Bowers and his colleagues are
doing for the American capital jury, only better-better because they are
concentrating on the words of actual jurors, sampling more systematically and
from a broader frame, and posing highly focused, detailed, and legally
sophisticated questions to all of their respondents. We will all be learning
from their data for years to come.
Two overarching issues-one primarily legal and one primarily psycho-
logical or social-scientific in nature-subsume the many important topics
illuminated by these early publications of the Capital Jury Project. The legal
or constitutional issue concerns whether and in what ways the various
Furman2-inspired and Gregg-approved capital sentencing reforms operate
to guide the discretion of the juries that the Supreme Court has authorized to
make life-and-death decisions in courtrooms across the country. Statistical
analyses of actual capital verdict patterns have for some time suggested that
the Court's leap of faith in Gregg and its companion cases4 (to the effect that
the capital jury's "unbridled discretion" could be fairly and meaningfully
regularized and controlled in ways that would eliminate arbitrary and
discriminatory decision-making)5 was unjustified.6 But this new generation
of studies gets beneath these statistical patterns to look at what actually goes
on during the capital decision-making process. What is emerging from this
and other research is not, in constitutional and other terms, a pretty picture.
* Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz. Ph.D., Stanford University, 1978;
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1978; M.A., Stanford University, 1971; B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1969.
1. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curian).
3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
5. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
6. E.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); William Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness
and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELNQ. 563 (1980); Hans Zeisel,
Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456
(1981).
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And, as increasingly larger and more detailed parts of the picture are
revealed-with data like those collected by the Capital Jury Project-it dashes
any hope the Court might have had, as one commentator put it, to "mask the
administration of the death penalty in individually isolated, inscrutable jury
deliberations." 7
The increasing scrutability of the capital jury focuses attention on the
second overarching issue, one that has remained only implicit in most studies
of capital punishment but which now is coming more clearly to the forefront
of research into the death sentencing process: How does our legal system
overcome jurors' deep-seated psychological prohibitions against violence,
enabling twelve average, law-abiding citizens to calmly and rationally
contemplate taking the life of another and engage in actions designed to bring
about that death? To be sure, the process of facilitating legal violence begins
long before jurors enter the courtroom. Elsewhere I have written about the
media stereotypes that systematically misinform the public about the causes
of violent crimes and the characteristics of the persons who commit
them-misinformation that facilitates the death sentencing process.8 We also
know that, despite (or perhaps because of) the political prominence of the
topic, the public continues to be systematically misinformed about the utility
of the death penalty in achieving important societal goals such as public
safety. In California, for example, my colleagues and I found that a majority
of citizens believed that the existence of capital punishment should be
justified primarily by the broader social purposes it serves (i.e., not just
retribution), but were badly misinformed about how well or poorly it functions
in this regard.9 But, as the research of the Capital Jury Project now is helping
to make clear, our system of capital punishment also depends upon the
implementation of various legal procedures inside the courtroom that distance
lay decision-makers from the practical realities and emotional complexities of
their decisions, thereby increasing the likelihood that defendants will be
sentenced to death.
I. BRINGING ORDER TO CHAOS, AND VICE VERSA
One of the most disturbing findings to emerge from this and other research
on the internal workings of the capital jury is the extent to which this
decision-making process is still governed by confusion, misunderstanding, and
even chaos. Jurors decide life-and-death questions laboring under numerous
7. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1741, 1779 (1987).
8. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and Mitigation, 32
SANTA CLARA L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
9. We found that about three-fourths of a representative sample of adult Californians believed that
the death penalty deterred murder, about two-thirds believed that even defendants sentenced to life
without parole managed to get out of prison, one-half believed that the death penalty was not
administered in a racially biased manner, and more than two times as many believed that the death
penalty was less costly than life in prison than believed the opposite. See Craig Haney et al., "Modern"
Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 619, 626, 629 (1994).
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misconceptions about the utility and operation of capital punishment-
sometimes unclear about the fundamental import of certain kinds of evidence
(including something as basic as whether the evidence is aggravating or
mitigating), almost always confused over the meaning of the all-important
capital instructions, in some instances wrong about the decision rules by
which they are to reach a sentencing verdict, and unclear about (or highly
skeptical of) the ultimate consequences of the very alternatives between which
they must choose. I have interviewed many capital jurors myself, and have
studied the interview transcripts compiled in conjunction with our comparative
study of capital jurors in Oregon and California."0 Now, I have had the
opportunity to read through excerpts of a number of the transcripts prepared
by the researchers of the Capital Jury Project and-all of my social scientist
instincts to find order in masses of data to the contrary-the thought continues
to gnaw at me that we are glimpsing at the ultimately chaotic and disorderly
record of what happens when average citizens, in groups of twelve, are asked
to do the impossible and inhuman-to fairly decide whether another human
being deserves to die.
But the thought also continues to gnaw at me that-despite what has been
said and written in judicial circles about the importance of bringing order to
this muddled area of law-many of the procedures that govern jury decision-
making are designed to sow the seeds of chaos and confusion, and ensure that
juror decision-making is based on partial truths rather than on a more
complete knowledge and understanding of the issues. That is, I wonder
whether the legal system insists upon telling capital jurors only part of the
story of how the death penalty really operates because to do otherwise would
place its implementation in grave jeopardy. For example, we know that capital
jurors come to the courtroom misinformed about the deterrent effect of the
death penalty and its comparatively expensive and racially inequitable
administration. Yet, the law systematically prevents jurors from receiving any
education whatsoever about these issues during the course of the capital trial.
We also know that capital jurors are uncertain about something so funda-
mental as whether, legally, life means life and death means death. Yet, the
legal system appears content with this lack of clarity, systematically refusing
to educate jurors in a realistic and evenhanded way about this topic.
The mistakes and misunderstandings are not randomly distributed. Indeed,
it is the asymmetry to the ignorance that we tolerate in capital trials that
raises concerns about underlying motivation. For example, Professor Sarat
emphasizes the tremendous effort that goes into "the graphic presentation of
the murder, as well as the actions which led to death and its consequences"
in the typical capital case, where the prosecution spares no expense
"bring[ing] to life the violence outside law."" Sarat perceptively contrasts
10. See Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and
the Jurisprudence of Death, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 149.
11. Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the
Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1124 (1995).
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this effort to the law's refusal to provide jurors with any information
whatsoever about the legal violence they are being asked to authorize. Thus,
capital jurors are brought face-to-face with the violence of the crime-as
perhaps they should be-while they are systematically prohibited from even
the faintest contemplation of the violence of the execution.' 2 How else may
one account for this, except as a way to facilitate legal violence at the
expense of honesty in the capital decision-making process?
The biases that are built into these procedures most often lead mistaken and
perplexed jurors to impose death-not life-sentences. Thus, jurors who are
misled by the capital instructions into believing that the judicial formulas
dictate a certain outcome in their deliberations usually have the outcome of
death in mind. Moreover, confusion over the instructions and over the nature
of the "promises" made during the death qualification process, as Professor
Hoffmann argues, can operate in tandem to provide pro-death jurors with a
powerful advantage over their pro-life counterparts in the deliberation
process. 3 Similarly, in light of the numerous errors Professor James
Luginbuhl and Julie Howe document, the authors are surely correct in
concluding that "[t]he effect of the jurors' poor understanding of the law is
to reduce the likelihood that capital defendants will benefit from the
safeguards against arbitrariness built into the North Carolina law." 4 Of
course, capital jurors themselves are desperately seeking order and certainty-
a framework by which they can understand what they are being asked to do.
In part because to confront the potential irrationality of a process that has
such profound consequences-consequences unlike any other legal process in
which laypersons participate-would be too painful and raise too many
questions about the nature of our system of capital justice than most of them
could bear, many jurors are highly motivated to impose whatever outcome
they believe has been dictated to them, whether or not they are accurate in
these beliefs. 5
12. Indeed, as this and other research shows, the execution remains not only hidden but, in the
minds of many of the jurors, is unlikely ever to occur. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
13. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in
Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1157-58 (1995).
14. James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or
Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1181 (1995).
15. By this, I also mean to suggest that however chaotic the retrospective interview accounts make
this process appear, they likely underestimate the magnitude of the problem. Moreover, this observation
raises a question about whether, as researchers, we may inadvertently suggest to jurors templates onto
which they profoundly need to grasp in ways that may distort the accuracy of their self reports. The
members of the Capital Jury Project appear to have successfully avoided this problem, and their work
provides powerful, troubling documentation of the confusion that reigns during the capital decision-
making process. But future researchers must guard against the possibility that we will bring more
rationality to this phenomenon than it in fact has, smoothing out the jagged edges of the process and
eventually making it look orderly (and more constitutionally palatable). This is the nature of social
science-to map our theories onto initially confusing arrays of data and thereby render them
interpretable and patterned. I cannot think of an area of social science about which researchers have
eventually concluded that no pattern actually exists, and this one is not likely to be an exception.
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II. THE ELUSIVENESS OF MITIGATION
In light of the prosecution's effective emphasis on the instrumentalities of
violence that Sarat identified in the guilt phase of the typical capital trial, it
is perhaps not surprising that, at the conclusion of this phase of the trial and
before any penalty phase testimony had been presented, Professor Sandys
found that twice as many capital jurors believed the defendant should be
sentenced to death as believed that a life sentence was the appropriate
verdict.' 6 At this point in the typical capital trial, of course, little or nothing
is known about the defendant other than his responsibility for the graphically
depicted crime that the jury has decided he committed. 7 Yet, there is fairly
clear constitutional caselaw indicating that the crime alone should not be the
exclusive basis upon which the jurors' life-and-death decision is to be
made. 8 Sandys' data certainly underscore the significant role that penalty-
phase mitigation must play if this mandate is to be abided. In theory, at least,
capital litigators know that "the absence of mitigating evidence is tantamount
to automatic imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, those involved in
death penalty litigation agree that the presentation of mitigation in the penalty
phase is of overwhelming importance."19
Yet, researchers are now beginning to learn that even in cases where
mitigation is presented-by no means necessarily the normative capital
case 2 -there is no reason to believe that jurors will understand its mitigating
significance or know how it is to be properly used in reaching a fair and just
verdict. Some of this derives from the fact that we seem to have become a
society that has, at this time in our history, a very difficult time conceptuali-
zing and legitimizing compassion, mercy, charity, and understanding-all
concepts that are intertwined with mitigation but which now have become
terribly hard for our citizens to define, harder to assert, and virtually
impossible to connect to something resembling a principled point of view.2"
But much of it also involves the sentencing procedures at work in capital
16. Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment:
A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. LJ. 1183, 1192 (1995).
17. Because the overwhelming majority of capital defendants are male, I have used the generic
masculine pronoun to refer to them throughout this Commentary.
18. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
19. Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed
Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95,
102 (1987).
20. E.g., Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor,
Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV. 849 (1992); William
S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273
(1990-199 1); Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 803-10 (1986).
21. Cf Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (arguing that
the law resists a widespread understanding of empathic knowledge despite its great explanatory power
in legal contexts).
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penalty trials and the failure of the capital sentencing instructions to correct
this collective blindness.
The sentencing instructions given capital jurors should, if nothing else,
clearly articulate and underscore the importance of broadening the focus of
the penalty-phase inquiry and extending the jurors' moral assessment to issues
beyond the guilt-phase crime itself. Indeed, this is the very purpose of the
separate penalty trial. Unfortunately, some of the research we have been
conducting in California on the comprehension of capital instructions suggests
that the instructions contribute to the jurors' narrow crime-focus by failing to
clarify what else (e.g., the background and character of the defendant) the
jurors should take into account.22 Indeed, the instructions appear to assist or
encourage the jurors to ignore the defendant's personhood. Thus, the
opportunity to put the defendant's life in context, to give it substance, texture,
history, a set of connections to other lives, is withheld until the final stage of
the trial-when it may be too late-and then capped off with instructions that
encourage jurors to -ignore it. The poor timing of the defense case in
mitigation and the crime-focus of the penalty instructions may help to explain
why, as Professor Bowers reports,23 the penalty trial (i.e., "evidence about
the defendant's punishment") was the least well-remembered stage of the
entire process for capital jurors,24 and that one-half of the jurors had actually
made up their minds (were "absolutely convinced" or "pretty sure") about the
appropriate penalty once they had convicted the defendant at the guilt
phase. 5 It is also not surprising, in this context, that forty percent of the
capital jurors believed the heinousness of the crime compelled a sentence of
death.26
Similarly, Luginbuhl and Howe have documented the way in which capital
penalty instructions in North Carolina say one thing but-because of the
manner in which they are written and ultimately so poorly understood by
capital jurors-accomplish another. 27 The problems are serious overall-
Luginbuhl and Howe found that less than fifty percent of the jurors they
interviewed could answer correctly more than one-half of the questions they
were asked about the operation of the sentencing statute-but they also are
asymmetrical in effect. Indeed, the lack of comprehension pushes the
22. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study
of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 430 (1994). Specifically,
our research found:
The seemingly inexorable (and perhaps unintended) narrowing of relevant considerations to the
circumstances of the crime and little else likely stems from the relative ease with which
legislative judgments and jury decision making can be precisely focused on crime characteris-
tics, as compared to the more difficult, elusive, and ultimately discretionary inquiry into the
moral nature and essential worth of the person whose life stands in the balance.
Id.
23. William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview ofEarly Findings,
70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).
24. Id. at 1087 tbl. 2.
25. Id. at 1090 tbl. 6.
26. Id. at 1091 tbl. 7.
27. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 14, at 1174-77.
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jurors-who believe they are "just following orders" that are contained in the
judicial instructions they have been given-toward death and away from life
verdicts. Thus, close to one-half or more of the capital jurors interviewed in
North Carolina mistakenly believed that the judicial instructions had
authorized them to rely on any aggravating circumstance, whether or not it
was enumerated in the statute, but to rely upon a mitigating circumstance only
when there was unanimous agreement that it had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
28
Just as Luginbuhl and Howe did in North Carolina, my colleagues and I
found in California that many key provisions of the capital sentencing
instruction were very poorly understood, but that "comprehension appears to
be worse when mitigating factors are considered." '29 Like Luginbuhl and
Howe, Mona Lynch and I concluded that the instruction failed to explain
novel and unfamiliar concepts, likely forcing jurors "to fall back on their own
prior knowledge."30 Yet, in part because few people have any preexisting
framework for understanding and applying the concept of mitigation, it is
more likely to be discounted or ignored in the jury's decision-making process.
For example, after having heard the California instruction read to them three
times, less than one-half of our subjects could provide even a partially correct
definition for the term "mitigation," almost one-third provided definitions that
bordered on being uninterpretable or incoherent, and slightly more than one
subject in ten was still so mystified by the concept that he or she was unable
to venture a guess about its meaning.3' In North Carolina, the death-tilting
effect of that state's instruction was underscored in the answers to another set
of questions that Luginbuhl and Howe posed: "[R]oughly one-fourth of the
jurors felt that death was mandatory when it was not and approximately one-
half of the jurors failed to appreciate those situations which mandated life." 32
In addition, our research in California reveals that not only do laypersons
have less "commonsense" understanding of the term "mitigation" than any
other key term in the instruction, but that defense attorneys also have a
difficult time conceptualizing and focusing clearly on it in their penalty-phase
arguments, or describing it meaningfully to capital juries in ways the jurors
can connect to specific evidence that has been presented.33 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that judges refuse to give any case-specific meaning
to the definition of mitigation that would add concreteness to what then
remains a hopelessly abstract concept. Not surprisingly, many capital jurors
are unable to hold on to mitigation in deliberation. Because it is so elusive,
28. Id. at 1167.
29. Id. at 1167; see also id. at 1169-70 ("Jurors fared the worst... in applying these same concepts
to mitigating factors. . . ."); see also Haney & Lynch, supra note 22, at 423-24.
30. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note, 14, at 1169; see also Haney & Lynch, supra note 22, at 427-
28.
31. Haney & Lynch, supra note 22, at 420-21.
32. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 14, at 1173.
33. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Debating Life and Death: Revised Instructions and Closing
Arguments in Capital Trials in California (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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it slips away in the face of more vivid and tangible arguments about
aggravation.34 For example, Lorelei Sontag and I found that death juries
talked as much about mitigation as life juries, but that they converted it into
aggravation or transformed it in ways that robbed it of its life-giving effect.35
Thus, the problem is not just that the concept of mitigation is poorly
expressed in the boilerplate penalty instructions themselves, but also that
courts do little or nothing proactive to ensure that mitigation-all that stands
between the defendant and the gallows in the typical capital trial-is
meaningfully presented and granted its appropriate significance by jurors.36
III. EMOTIONAL AND MORAL DISTANCING
Using the Milgram obedience studies" as a point of departure, Robert
Weisberg's classic article on capital jury decision-mitking posed an important
empirical question-"whether jurors artificially distance themselves from
choices by relying on legal formalities."38 At the time of his writing,
Weisberg was correct to observe that social scientists had little direct data
with which to shed light on the question. Our comparative study of California
and Oregon capital jurors was intended in part to address this and related
questions, and the Capital Jury Project has examined these issues more
elaborately and comprehensively than did our research. Data from all of these
studies seem to confirm Weisberg's suspicion. Among the various researchers
who have come to similar conclusions, Professor Hoffmann's analysis of his
interviews with Indiana capital jurors39 speaks directly to the emotional and
moral distancing that occurs in the capital decision-making process. His
interviews uncovered not only "juror misperception of responsibility for the
death sentencing decision,"4 but also widespread difficulty in accepting
34. Professor Sarat reports that at least some of his jurors fell prey to a common turn of logic that
is suggested by many prosecutors in their penalty arguments but which, if accepted, effectively
eliminates any factor or circumstance from being given mitigating effect. A juror told Sarat that the
defendant in his jury's trial "'was under the influence of alcohol and drugs .... But so what? I mean
a lot of people get drunk, but they don't take guns and go shoot up the Jiffy Store .... He shot someone
because he wanted money. Like lots of people want money but they don't kill other people to get it."'
Sarat, supra note 11, at 1128 (quoting an unidentified juror). Realize that this common and seemingly
plausible way of thinking about mitigation redefines it in a way that neutralizes any such evidence that
might be presented (since there is no influence, experience, or circumstance that all people respond to
in the same way, and certainly not in a murderous way). Surely "mitigation" was not intended to be
equated with an absolute compulsion or invariant response, but many jurors end capital penalty trials
never having been disabused of this misconception.
35. See Haney et al., supra note 10, at 167-68; Lorelei Sontag, Deciding Death: A*Legal and
Empirical Analysis of Penalty Phase Jury Instructions and Capital Decision-Making 156-61 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Santa Cruz), reprinted by UMI Dissertation
Services).
36. Cf. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORtNELL L. REV. 655 (1989) (arguing that the proper emotional dynamic of capital punishment
requires courts to actively emphasize jurors' obligations of empathy in judging defendants).
37. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHoRITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEw (1974).
-38. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 391.
39. Hoffmann, supra note 13.
40. Id. at 1138 n.ll.
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responsibility for the defendant's fate,4' and even questions about the
propriety of jurors performing the capital sentencing task in the first place.42
Perhaps not surprisingly, despite fairly consistent national data about capital
jurors' inability to accurately comprehend and recall sentencing instructions,
Hoffmann found that most Indiana jurors "remember vividly the portion of the
judge's instructions that indicated the jury's decision was only 'a recommen-
dation. ,0
41
Many of the previously discussed misconceptions and misunderstandings-
as well as the law's systematic refusal to educate capital jurors about certain
core realities that attach to the administration of the death penalty-enhance
the moral and emotional distancing that facilitates death verdicts. One of the
most basic misconceptions that separates capital jurors from the consequences
of their decision is the belief that the sentencing alternatives with which they
are presented will never have their stated consequences. Widespread cynicism
about the legal system allows many capital jurors to argue that death penalty
decision-making is not "really" about life and death, but rather about
safeguarding society against the future dangerousness of a defendant who is
likely to be released some day. Virtually all of the social science researchers
who have interviewed capital jurors have been struck with their tendency to
recast their sentencing decision in this way. From the Capital Jury Project,
Luginbuhl and Howe's data address the issue perhaps most systematically.
They found that three-fourths of those jurors who sentenced a defendant to
death believed that the defendant would spend less than twenty years in prison
if not condemned to die. An equally high percentage of death sentencing
jurors were concerned about the possibility that "the defendant might return
to society" if they were to let him live.' But jurors voice these concerns
even in states where capital sentencing statutes give them the sentencing
option of life without the possibility of parole in lieu of the death penalty.4 5
Of course, it is difficult to imagine a more effective way to distance jurors
from the profound moral and emotional implications of their sentencing
verdicts than to allow them to operate under the misconception that the life-
and-death decisions they seem to confront really are not."
41. See id. at 1142-43.
42. See id. at 1143. Indeed, the issue of responsibility loomed so large for one jury that a lone
holdout was able to sway the others by bringing them face-to-face with the consequences of their
decision: "I told them, 'Put the kid in the chair. Now would you go up there [and] throw the switch
yourself?' They said, 'Well that's not my job.' I said, 'You are doing your job now. If you say go
ahead, that's the same as [if] you are doing it."' Id. at 1146 (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
43. Id. at 1147.
44. These data are presented and discussed in LuginbuhI & Howe, supra note 14, at 1178-79.
45. In California, for example, we found that members of the public in general did not believe that
life without parole meant the defendant would never be released from prison, and that death-qualified
respondents were more likely'to hold this mistaken belief. See Haney et al., supra note 9, at 628-29 tbl.
3. And this widespread misconception--because it typically goes uncorrected in capital trials and is
nowhere addressed in the capital instruction--gave rise to concerns voiced by actual capital jurors in
California. Haney et al., supra note 10, at 170-71.
46. It is probably worth reflecting on the parallels to our own connections with this morally
complex and emotionally difficult subject-that is, to what extent do our roles as social scientists and
lawyers who merely study the death sentencing process in some ways similarly depend upon the
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CONCLUSION
As I read through the insightful research of the Capital Jury Project that is
published in this Symposium, I renewed my respect for the plight of capital
jurors. They are for the most part highly dedicated, well-meaning people who
work extremely hard at an impossible task, forced to do the moral dirtywork
of a system that is not even honest enough with them to insist that they have
the full story about the purposes, ambiguities, complexities, and consequences
of the actions the state invites (indeed, urges and implores) them to take. In
Professor Hoffmann's compelling look at the effect of Indiana's judge-
override provision on that state's capital jurors, he suggests that they "mislead
themselves"47 about the extent of their responsibility for the sentencing
decision and concludes: "During the jury deliberations, most jurors found
ways to overcome, or avoid confronting, their sense of personal moral
responsibility for the defendant's fate."4 Without substantially disagreeing,
I would suggest instead that capital jurors do no more than respond to the
numerous mystifying paradigms, procedures, and verbal formulations with
which the law-indeed, our entire society-surrounds them long before they
finally hear the judge's confusing instructions. Furthermore, if the legal
machinery of death failed to perform these many rituals of bad faith, it would
have a difficult time indeed finding normal, healthy volunteers for the task of
condemning their fellow citizens to die.
distance we can create from core realities of the death penalty, and what implications might flow from
that?
47. Hoffmann, supra note 13, at 1157 (italics in original).
48. Id. at 1156.
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